An Interdisciplinary Research Approach to Political Science – Specific Modeling and Simulation Tools by Voinea, Camelia
www.ssoar.info
An Interdisciplinary Research Approach to Political
Science – Specific Modeling and Simulation Tools
Voinea, Camelia
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Voinea, C. (2003). An Interdisciplinary Research Approach to Political Science – Specific Modeling and Simulation
Tools. Annals of the University of Bucharest / Political science series, 5, 69-98. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-381170
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
  
 
 
 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH APPROACH TO 
POLITICAL SCIENCE – SPECIFIC MODELING AND 
SIMULATION TOOLS 
 
CAMELIA VOINEA 
 
 
 
This paper introduces a research approach on new modeling and simulation techniques for 
the social and political behavior and attitude in the context of social and political change. Political 
Science needs specific analysis, representation, modeling, simulation and predictive tools. The 
need for such techniques is motivated by the increasing complexity of the empirical experimental 
data and conceptual knowledge involved in the representation, analysis, modeling and prediction 
of social behavior and attitude with respect to social and political value systems, especially when 
such values are subject to social change processes. The work reported here aims at developing a 
more believable approach on artificial agents and artificial societies by means of: (i) new 
representation and modeling concepts of the artificial agent as an agent-environment interaction 
system, (ii) new representation and modeling concepts of the interaction and knowledge in 
artificial agents, and (iii) new computational theory explaining the learning and the emergence 
mechanisms of social behavior and attitude in an artificial society. The concepts of autonomous 
agents, agent-environment interaction systems (aeiss), and computational attitude are defined and 
explained. Attitude emergence in artificial society is defined and explained by means of the 
Theory of Learning. A Case Study on attitude emergence in the simulation of a team cooperation 
game is described, analyzed and an interpretation of the computational attitude is provided.   
 
Keywords: behavior learning, attitude emergence simulation, artificial autonomous 
agents, artificial society.  
 
 
1.  Why Study Attitudes? 
 
This paper introduces a research approach on new modeling and 
simulation techniques for the social and political behavior and attitude in the 
context of social and political change.   
The need for such techniques is motivated by the increasing complexity 
of the empirical experimental data and conceptual knowledge involved in the 
representation, analysis, modeling and prediction of social behavior and attitude 
with respect to social and political value systems, especially when such values 
are subject to social change processes. The degree of complexity of such data 
and knowledge regards not only the collection of data, but mainly the 
representation and processing of such huge amounts of information in order to 
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reach valid predictive outcomes. In this respect there are several specific 
approaches provided by the so-called Sciences of the Artificial, namely 
Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Artificial Life, Autonomous Agents, 
Artificial Biologically-inspired Evolving Systems, Immunotronics, to name just 
a few. Much of the research approaches elaborated in these scientific and 
information technology areas are essentially aimed at providing an artificial 
society system as a means of analysis, representation, modeling and simulation 
of the real society in the artificial: the agents as a representation of the human 
actors, the society of agents as a representation of the real human society, the 
social relations, the society evolution model etc. This kind of artificial society is 
usually represented as a MultiAgent System (MAS), as a Distributed Artificial 
Intelligent System (DAI), Software Agent System (SA), Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANN), Cellular Automata (CA) and many others. The unifying 
“thread” of all such research approaches is their interdisciplinary character 
combining computational, cognitive and normative social models which might 
enable any type of artificial agent (either embodied or virtual) to develop 
believable social behavior and to (self)organise in groups and societies. These 
researches provide the means to fight a major drawback of the classical 
empirical research, Statistics or Game Theory which put too much emphasis on 
logic, rationality and economic principles and too little on the cognitive and 
normative aspects. From this point of view, the work reported here aims at 
developing a more believable approach to artificial agents and artificial societies 
by means of: (i) new representation and modeling concepts of the artificial 
agent as an agent-environment interaction system, (ii) new representation and 
modeling concepts of the interaction and knowledge in artificial agents, and (iii) 
new computational theory explaining the learning and the emergence 
mechanisms of social behavior and attitude in an artificial society and its 
predictive power.   
This approach aims at providing an Artificial Life-based simulation tool 
for studies and researches on political science issues like the voting behavior, 
the political attitude, the political leadership, the political organization and 
decision-making.   
In order to elaborate such a simulation tool we proceed by defining 
proper concepts and principles concerning the type of social actor we model as 
an artificial agent, the appropriate concepts and principles of computationally 
representation of such agents and multiagent systems, and the appropriate 
computational theory concerning the emergence of attitudes in such artificial 
social systems. 
There is already much research work on such interdisciplinary issues. The 
most investigated areas are almost always those which involve human beliefs, 
intentional behavior or just society, because these areas allow the young 
sciences of the artificial to reach and conquer a “promised land” – a land of 
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knowledge and research on human brain, mind, and cognition. To select only 
one of these most appealing issues, let us take a look on the scientific literature 
on the social attitude.  
The domain of attitudinal theory and research is quite huge. The interest 
in this topic is widespread because of the evidence that much of our personal 
and social life and behavior is influenced by psychological attitudes. A 
psychological attitude is something hard to define since it involves a huge 
diversity of other complex concepts and representations of human thought, 
cognition, reasoning and affect, like: beliefs, desires, feelings, hopes, judgments, 
opinions, emotions, and wishes, to name but a few. It seems that our experience 
is inevitably related to one or another of these phenomena. Another reason for 
the interest in attitudes comes from another evidence, namely that our behavior 
is influenced by our attitudes, whereby the attitude is seen as the “cause”, while 
behavior is seen as the “effect”1. In this regard, psychological attitudes become 
very important for the study of why and how behaviors and attitudes are related 
to each other.  
A huge amount of research work has been developed in the study of 
attitudes both in social psychology and in cognitive sciences. My previous 
work
2
 on computational analysis, representation, modeling and simulation of 
attitudes and its applicability in the learning theory has found insight in the 
American school of social psychology represented by the works of Gordon W. 
Allport
3
, W. Doob
4
, W.J. McGuire
5
 and D.W. Rajecki
6
. 
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 an overview on the scientific 
literature concerning the attitude modeling is provided. Section 3 describes the 
shifts in modeling paradigms induced by interdisciplinary researches on human 
intelligence, memory and knowledge and introduces the new concepts and 
modeling principles which proved to be more appropriate for social and political 
modeling and simulation of attitude in the artificial. Section 4 defines the concept of 
the Agent-Environment Interaction System and the foundation of a proper attitude 
emergence simulation paradigm: learning_while_interacting. Section 5 is a 
follow-up of this paradigm specification: it provides the conceptual definition of 
a computational attitude and of an artificial society simulation architecture 
which provides for believable behavioral organization and development. 
                                                          
1  F.C. BARTLETT, Remembering, Cambridge University Press, 1932. 
2  C.F. VOINEA, Learning from Change. Foundations of a Theory of Learning in Agent-
Environment Interaction Systems, Doctoral Dissertation, 1997. 
3  G.W. ALLPORT, “Attitudes”, in C.A. Murchinson (ed.), A Handbook of Social 
Psychology, 2, Russell & Russell, New York, 1935. 
4  L.W. DOOB, “The Behavior of Attitudes”, in Psychological Review, 54, 1947. 
5  W.J. McGUIRE, “The nature of attitudes and attitude change”, in G. Lindzey, E. Aronson 
(eds.), The Handbook of social psychology, 2nd edition, 3, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1969. 
6  D.W. RAJECKI, Attitudes: Themes and Advances, Sinauer Associates Inc., 
Sunderland, MA, 1982. 
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Section 6 is a presentation of the Theory of Attitudes and its representation, 
modeling and predictive characteristics and power. Section 7 resumes the case 
studies and the simulations of attitude emergence scenarios which provided the 
means for a comprehensive performance analysis and evaluation. In Section 8 
some conclusions are drawn and future work guidelines are generally described.   
 
 
2. Modeling Attitudes: What is an Attitude? 
 
2.1. The Attitude in Social Psychology Research 
 
As Allport defines it, the attitude is mainly concerned with our 
experience and the dynamic organization of our behavior depending on our 
attitudinal experience. He defines the attitude as a  
 
... mental or neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a 
directive or dynamic influence upon the individual‟s response to all objects and situations 
with which it is related. 
  
In a rather dynamically evolving view meant to emphasize the 
fundamental relation between attitudes and behaviors, Doob has defined the 
attitude mainly from the point of view of the influence it has on behaviors‟ co-
ordination.  In his approach, an attitude is defined as 
 
... an implicit response, which is both anticipatory and mediating in reference to 
patterns of overt responses, evoked by a veriety of stimulus patterns as a result of previous 
learning or gradients of generalization and discrimination, itself a cue and drive-
producing, and considered socially significant in the individual society. 
 
According to this view, the attitude can be best defined by means of three basic 
components: (A) Affect – the evaluative component, (B) Behavior – the intentional 
component, and (C) Cognition – a component which concerns beliefs about the 
attitudinal object. As attitudes are viewed as a source of behavioral motivation and 
organization, the best way to understand how attitudes relate to our behavior is to 
describe their fundamental functions.  McGuire has summarized four reasons why 
attitudes exist at all: (i) the utilitarian or adaptive function, (ii) the economy or 
knowledge function, (iii) the expressive or self-realizing function, and (iv) the 
preserving or ego-defensive function.  
This approach on modeling and computational representation of attitudes 
focuses on those aspects and components of attitudes which provide for an 
explanation of the way they dynamically influence behavior and learning: (A) 
affect, (B) behavior and (C) cognition. 
   
73 
2.2. The Attitude in Cognitive Psychology Research 
 
The cognitive psychology approach on attitudes studies mainly the affect 
component. Much of the research work in this area focuses on the attentional 
processes, which influence the agent‟s goal-achieving behaviors. The attitude is 
therefore viewed as basically determined by the emotions the agents might 
experience with respect to their own goals. In this view, the attitudes are defined 
as “valenced reactions to events, other agents, and objects”7 based on affect and 
emotional cognitive structure which influence the attentional power of the 
agents in pursuing their goals. 
This orientation of cognitive research has mainly developed towards 
comprehensive computational models of communication and affective human-
machine dialog, in which some of the relationships between communication and 
affect are explored
8
. Such computational models need system architectures that 
make various kinds of affective states possible in the artificial intelligent agents, 
along with some implications for the various communication processes. The 
basic assumptions for this kind of modeling include the idea that human beings 
have typically many different, hierarchically organized affective dispositions 
capable of interacting with new information to produce affective states, distract 
attention, and interrupt ongoing processes, providing for a tendency to penetrate 
an attention filter mechanism which seems to account for the partial loss of 
control involved in emotions. The role of affect in the cognitive development of 
autonomous agents turned into research on phenomena commonly referred to as 
emotional (affective states).  In this respect, agents‟ behaviors are considered as 
the results of the interactions of two architecture subsystems: a physiologically-
based, low cognitive-complexity motivational system – on the one hand – and a 
conceptual representation-based, high cognitive-complexity goal processing 
system – on the other hand. An artificial autonomous agent has to adapt to 
changes in its world in order to ensure its continuing survival. Autonomous 
agent‟s behavior is viewed as based on an “existing motivational system that 
guides its behavior and influences its on-going cognitive development”9.   
Research work on learning in autonomous agents has focused mainly on 
the role of affect and emotions in the perception and attentional processes that 
guide behavior. Learning allows people to adapt to an ever-changing 
environment and to develop new forms of behavior in order to achieve the many 
                                                          
7  A. ORTONY, G.L. CLORE, A. COLLINS, The Cognitive Structure of Emotions, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
8  A. SLOMAN, “Prolegomena to a Theory of Communication and Affect”, in A. Ortony, 
J. Slack, O. Stock (eds.), Communication from an Artificial Intelligence Perspective: Theoretical 
and Applied Issues, Heidelberg, 1993, pp. 229-260. 
9  T. READ, The Role of Affect in Cognitive Development, Birmingham School of 
Psychology, Technical Report, 1992. 
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goals that they have at any one time. This learning is mediated by various 
attentional processes and focused on what the agent considers to be important 
for achieving its current goals. 
 
 
2.3. The Attitude in Researches on Memory, Remembering and Learning  
 
The early work of Bartlett
10
 regarding the re-constructive memory and 
processes of recall and the more recent work of Walter Freeman
11
 on the 
neuropsychology of learning, emotional and social behavior processes are 
providing a fundamental assumption for a computational theory on attitude 
learning: both authors are trying to define attitude as a dynamic process 
fundamentally based on the capacity of re-constructive recall of the human 
memory. There are no fundamental differences between their models of attitude.  
If there is any such difference, then this could reside on different scientific 
perspectives over the human memory: in the case of Bartlett we deal with a 
psychological perspective over remembering processes, while in the case of 
Freeman we deal with a perspective based on the cell neurophysiology and 
biochemistry. Though their research approaches are elaborated in time at a 
distance of more than 60 years, there is a common thread unifying their 
thinking. This common thread rather concerns the concepts of information, 
memory and recall than concepts regarding the psychological roots of social 
behavior. But more on this in the coming up sections. 
What is to be emphasized in their researches is that the attitude names a 
complex psychological state or process which builds up dynamic representations 
of the past experience. As Bartlett puts it, these dynamic representations of 
some individual past experience are built up as remembering processes in which 
the recall is a “construction made largely on the basis of this attitude, and its 
general effect is that of a justification of the attitude”. 
In this kind of view, an act of remembering is not a retrieval of stored 
information, as we usually think when we deal with computational theories on 
memory and concepts representations.  As Walter Freeman says, it is the  
 
construction of a pattern when an appropriate stimulus or preceding pattern 
constrains the limbic system into one of its learned basins of attraction, thereby releasing 
a creative dynamic process for which the outcome is never precisely the same twice.  
 
The point in this view is that it allows for an essential shift in the 
computational thinking: a shift toward self-organisation in viewing both 
memory processes and behavioral and attitudinal processes. The issue of  
                                                          
10  F.C. BARTLETT, op. cit. 
11  W.J. FREEMAN, Societies of Brains, LEA, 1995. 
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re-constructive memory becomes fundamental for a computational theory on 
attitude emergence and learning and it will be introduced in the next sections. 
 
 
3. Shift in Research Paradigms: A Point of View on Knowledge, 
Interaction and Memory  
 
A conventional characterization of an autonomous agent is that of a 
“machinery” which extracts information about the world by its various sensors 
and uses this information to construct internal models of its world able to 
support a decision-making process which identifies further actions to take in 
order to achieve some goal. This is the classical Artificial Intelligence‟s (AI) 
and Machine Learning‟s (ML) point of view concerning artificial agents as 
information processing systems. The basic idea is that the world of the artificial 
intelligent agent can be characterized as a world of “information” and the 
interaction of this agent with the world can be understood as acquisition and 
processing of the acquired information in order to produce knowledge about the 
world and knowledge about how to do something in the world. 
The information processing point of view as it has been described by 
Newell and Simon
12
 represents the fundamental paradigm that has shaped our 
comprehension of the intelligence and learning in the artificial. Classical AI‟s 
main rival in the past decade – Connectionism13 – rejects the idea of explicit 
symbolic processing as the basic principle in generating intelligent behavior.  
Nevertheless, it still embodies the concept of information processing applied not 
at the level of explicit symbols, but at the level of collective behavior of a large 
number of simple neural computational elements.  
In spite of its widespread use, the concepts of information and information 
processing system have been seriously weakened by fundamental research works 
in cellular biology
14
, in neurobiology and neuropsychology
15
, chemistry and the 
chaos theory
16
, and philosophy
17-18
, which have started to be echoed by most 
                                                          
12  A. NEWELL, H.A. SIMON, Human Problem Solving, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ, 1972. 
13  D.E. RUMELHART, J.L. McCLELLAND, Parallel Distributed Processes, MIT Press, 
Bradford Book, 1986. 
14  H.R. MATURANA, F. VARELA, Autopoiesis and Cognition, Reidel, 1980. 
15  W.J. FREEMAN, “Chaos in the CNS: Theory and Practice”, in R.J. Greenspan, C.P. Kyriacou 
(eds.), Flexibility and Constraints in Behavioral Systems, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1994; “Chaos 
in the Brain: Possible Roles in Biological Intelligence”, in International Journal of Intelligent 
Systems, 10, 1995, pp. 71-88. 
16  I. PROGOGINE, I. STENGERS, Order Out of Chaos, Flamingo, Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1985. 
17  M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Le philosophe et la sociologie. Eloge de la Philosophie, 
Gallimard, Paris, 1960. 
18  M. HEIDEGGER, Being and Time, Basic Blaackwell, Oxford, 1962. 
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recent researches in AI, Alife and ML sciences. These researches offered further 
evidence that biological systems posses the powerful self-organisation 
mechanisms required to develop and maintain the “dynamical structural couplings 
that must exist between them and the environment they interact in”19.  
This reality leads to the necessity of re-considering the conception and design 
of artificial autonomous systems and the type of prediction and simulation 
applications they can be used to perform. This is what we can describe as the 
fundamental question for the agent-based simulation architecture design. Situated 
autonomous multi-agent systems technology is in search for a paradigm that can give 
the appropriate support to the development of more flexible mechanisms to provide 
for intelligent behavior in the artificial. What an artificial autonomous agent or 
multiagent system needs is a proper internal structure and proper internal mechanisms 
which endow it with the capability of an adaptive behavior within a continuously-
changing environment. It is only this kind of internal structure which allows for the 
development of modeling and simulations applications in the artificial which might 
mimic in a believable way the real social behavior of the human individuals and 
provide insight on how artificial society–based prediction might look like in areas like 
political science, security, cultural transfer, and other issues of societal interest.  
Two fundamental issues are being revised in particular: the knowledge 
level descriptors of behavior and the mechanisms which coordinate perception 
and action. There are three fundamental hypotheses about cognition which 
essentially distinguish situated cognition from classical AI and they regard 
knowledge, memory and interaction. 
 
 
3.1.  On Knowledge  
 
It becomes more and more obvious within the research community the 
trend which regards classical knowledge level descriptors – prototype 
hierarchies, scripts or strategies – as an observer‟s model of behavioral patterns 
and not as dynamically evolving structures and mechanisms inside the artificial 
intelligent agent.   
What we do know is that knowledge can be represented, but the idea we 
have about its representation in an artificial multi-agent system is far from the 
physiological and biological reality of the representation mechanisms in intelligent 
living creatures. We do not know yet the very mechanism of intelligence in the 
living, however, as Freeman puts it, there is neurobiological and neurophysiologic 
evidence which leads us to think that knowledge does have a representation, but this 
representation cannot be of the type of storage structures like statements of belief, 
                                                          
19  F.J. VARELA, “The Re-Enchantment of the Concrete”, in L. Steels, R. Brooks (eds.), 
Artificial Life Route to Artificial Intelligence, LEA, 1995. 
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scripts or schema of behavior. The point in the representation mechanism resides in 
the fact that knowledge should be viewed as a product of the interaction of the agent 
with its environment, and not as a physical substrate from which behavior is 
generated. As a product of the interaction between the agent and the agent‟s 
environment, it cannot be reduced to – or replaced by – representations of behavior 
or of the environment:  knowledge is a product of agent-environment interaction 
mechanisms and is subject to agent‟s interpretation over repeated cycles of 
perceiving and acting.  Knowledge arises as a side-effect of this interaction and it 
exists as such as far as the interaction exists and the agent finds its meaning by 
associating it to a particular kind of contextual (environmental) change. 
 
 
3.2.  On Memory 
 
It is common place already the notion of “memory structures” which hold 
knowledge and provide it whenever recalled by means of retrieval procedures. 
Whatever these “memory structures” look like, they are assumed to be “meaningful 
structures” both from a formal and from their content point of view. The point 
situated cognition makes on memory is that such “meaningful structures” are not 
fixed, given or static in either the environment or in human memory
20
. The memory 
of the living creatures in not a place where things like schema, category, rule, 
procedure, script or frame are stored. Knowledge is not stored as it is in the 
computer systems, but constructed each time innate or acquired “meaningful 
structures” are used21. Therefore, memory should be thought of as an interaction 
and pattern re-construction rather than a storage device. This approach would make 
a significant difference between the classical agent (multi-agent system) as an 
information processing system and the artificial intelligent agent (multi-agent 
system) as an artificial autonomous system: this difference should be expected to 
influence the knowledge representation and the interaction with the environment. 
 
 
3.3.  On Interaction 
 
The classical computational systems address the information processing 
problem of identifying and classifying properties of the world. The problem the 
autonomous agent (multi-agent system) faces is that of guiding their actions in the 
environment on the basis of perceived information in some local context.  Since 
such situation would permanently change as a result of the intrinsic dynamics of the 
environment and also as a result of the agent‟s (multi-agent system) actions, the 
                                                          
20  W.J. FREEMAN, “Neural Networks and Chaos”, in Journal of Theoretical Biology, 
171, 1994, pp. 13-18. 
21  F.C. BARTLETT, op. cit. 
 78 
reference system for understanding the perceived information is no longer a pre-
determined perceiver-independent world. It is the agent‟s (multi-agent system) 
embodied structure which provides the physical support of its cognitive functions. 
This point of view has been called the enactive approach
22
 to perceptually guided 
action: its overall concern is not to determine how some perceiver-independent 
world is to be computationally recovered, but rather to determine the principles 
which explain how action can be perceptually guided in a perceiver-dependent 
world. The enactive approach captures an essential feature of what an artificial 
autonomous agent (multi-agent system) should be: it views the agent and its 
environment as structurally coupled
23
. The notion of structural coupling will be 
adopted in the computational attitude theory as well.  
 
 
4.  The Agent-Environment Interaction Systems 
 
The Agent-Environment Interaction System (aeis) is viewed here as a 
dynamical system. Our basic assumption for the understanding of the autonomy 
of artificial agents (multi-agent systems) is that autonomy emerges from the 
learned attitudes as a means of self-control over co-ordinated behaviors, where 
by “behavior” we mean both innate and learned behavior.  
The traditional view upon artificial intelligent agents (multi-agent systems) 
is that of systems which act on the environment so as to change the state of the 
environment in some way and to keep track of this change in such a way that the 
return the agent gets from the environment reinforces its actions until a goal is 
successfully accomplished and the respective return is maximized.  
This information processing view has a fundamental weakness in that it 
establishes some kind of sequential “sense-think-then-act” cycle24, hence 
committing the agent to become a “medium” in which “sensed information” is 
transformed into “representations” of situation-action pairs (from which it can 
then select the most rewarding ones) and to transform back this representation 
into information which guides the performing of the selected action.  
What an agent does in reality is not to act on the world as something 
separate from the world. The agent is part of its environment and its actions 
are due to being a part of this environment. The agent does not simply act, but 
interact with the world. Both the agent and the environment are shaped by this 
interaction. It is the dynamics of this interaction that we are interested in and 
also in the way the agent acquires autonomy in its own environment. 
We can therefore proceed to the conceptual specification of the artificial 
autonomous agent (or multiagent system) as a system of dynamically 
                                                          
22  F.J. VARELA, The Embodied Mind, MIT Press, 1992. 
23  Ibidem. 
24  A. NEWELL, “The Knowledge Level”, in Artificial Intelligence, 8, 1982. 
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interacting processes: these processes belong to either the agent or the 
environment, and the effect of their interaction is quantified in both the agent 
and the environment.  
Let us think of these two interacting entities – the Agent and the 
Environment – as a whole, as a system in itself: the agent-environment 
interaction system. Let us further consider S to be the state space (where by 
“state” we mean both agent‟s specific states and environmental specific 
states), and W to be the interaction state space (where by “interaction state” 
we mean states dynamically emerging from the interaction between the agent 
and its environment and directly quantifiable in both the agent and the 
environment). Thus we can define a mapping from pairs of specific states to 
interaction states such that an interaction functional operator (I) transforms a 
pair of arbitrary specific agent‟s ( as ) and environment‟s ( es ) states into an 
emerging aeis’ state ( aeiss ): 
 
WS,Ws,Ss,ss)s,s(I
,WSS:I
aeiseaaeisea 

for
 (1) 
 
In other words, any interaction will extend the initial state of specific 
states (S) with emerging new states ( aeiss ) such that the aeis state space (W) 
will grow each time and as long as the agent and the environment interact with 
each other.  
Let us now consider Pi and Pj two dynamically correlated processes such 
that Pi transforms an agent state into an environmental state, and Pj transforms 
an environmental state into an agent specific state:  
 
 
 




aej
eai
ssP
ssP
 (2) 
 
We say that Pi and Pj are dynamically correlated if their effects (either 
independently or cumulatively) can be quantified and represented as a new 
emerging state of the agent-environment interaction system: 
 
       aeisajeiea ssP,sPIs,sI   (3) 
 
Simple examples of such processes are the processes of environmental 
change like variations of temperature which usually produce variations of the 
agent internal state (homeostasis). Another example concerns the processes of 
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change of the level or intensity of social regard which may produce 
corresponding variations of the agent psychological state for agents which are 
sensitive to social relations gradients. 
Define a behavior as a pair of dynamically correlated processes in which each 
process represents an action resulting in a transition to another state, and a pair of 
such processes represents an interaction resulting in a transformation of both agent 
and environment specific states into a new emerging state in their interaction space. 
Define an agent-environment interaction system as a dynamic system of 
interaction processes.   
Define an autonomous agent as an agent-environment interaction system 
of coordinated behaviors. 
Define a computational attitude as a behavioral capacity of an 
autonomous agent to adapt to a social environmental change or stimulus.  
 
 
5.  The Computational Attitude 
 
Computational Attitudes are representations of the overall behavior of an 
artificial autonomous agent (multi-agent) system defined as an aeis. It serves as 
the fundamental mechanism of the aeis behavioral emergence patterns in 
dynamically changing social contexts.  
The attitudes of the artificial autonomous agent with respect to the 
environmental contextual variations emerge and operate at the level of the 
cognitive functions which associate aeis’ behaviors to the control aeis is able to 
perform over its contextual situations.  Their fundamental role is to “couple” the 
change in the agent with the change in the environment in a controlled manner, 
where by “control” we mean the control an intentional autonomous agent has 
over its own goal-achieving and world-cognitive means. We assume that this 
(self)control is performed by the autonomous agent by means of coordinating 
several simultaneously active (innate and acquired) cognitive behaviors. 
The self control problem in an artificial autonomous agent defined as an 
aeis can be stated as follows: given an aeis characterized by a n  m-dimensional 
state space, find a (self)control function of n  m parameters (if such function 
exists) which takes as input an m-dimensional change in the environment and 
generates as output an n-dimensional behavioral change by transforming the m-
dimensional environmental change into a self n-dimensional agent internal 
change which follows-up the input as an instantaneous dynamic goal.   
In other words, the self control problem of an artificial autonomous agent 
(multi-agent) system which faces environmental contextual changes is to find a 
coordination policy which provides for the agent overall behavior in the state space. 
This coordination policy is called computational attitude (see Figure 1). The 
formalism used to define the computational attitude is based on Variational Calculus. 
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attitude 
 
behaviors 
co-ordination 
policy 
 
 n – dimensional 
m – dimensional selfcontrol agent 
environmental function behavioral 
change change 
    
 
 
 
Figure 1. The fundamental role of the computational attitude is the “coupling” of a m-dimensional 
environmental change to a n-dimensional agent behavioral change 
 
 
The computational architecture of such a control function over n-dimensional 
behavior change relies on a Behavior Coordinator Subsystem which provides 
for the coordination policy, and on a Re-Constructive Memory Subsystem which 
provides for dynamic representations of the knowledge from interaction called 
Behavioral Couplings (cobs).   
 
Figure 2. A computational attitude architecture 
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The Theory of Attitudes relies on a learning paradigm called 
learning_while_interacting and proves that the Behavior Coordinator function 
can be approximated by an Attitude Learning (A_Learning) function
25
.  
 
 
6.  The Theory of Attitudes 
 
The Theory of Attitudes
26
 is based on the concept of computational 
attitude in an artificial society of autonomous agents and puts forward the 
foundations of a general social learning theory in agent-environment interaction 
systems (aeiss).  
The Theory of Attitudes views learning in aeiss as a fundamental means 
to dynamically correlate the variation in the interaction space to the structural 
and cognitive change in the artificial agent‟s behavioral patterns. It represents 
the conceptual foundation of a research paradigm on the attitude emergence in 
an artificial society. This theory is two-folded: one of its pillars is represented 
by a general view of the artificial aeis as an artificial learning system, and the 
other is a view of the attitude emergence as based on behavior coupling 
processes.  
The learning process structure of an autonomous agent (multi-agent) 
system defined as an aeis consists of the following classes of processes: (i) 
interaction processes; (ii) gradient-following processes; (iii) predictive 
processes; (iv) coupling processes; (v) re-constructive memory processes. 
The Theory of Attitudes proves that agent‟s attitude with respect to an 
environmental change emerges as the aeis learns successive approximations of 
behavioral co-ordination function by dynamically associating minimal attitude 
values (i.e., corresponding to optimal trajectories in the state space w.r.t. the 
agent‟s goal) to self-rewarding values (internal payoffs) and behavioral 
couplings (i.e. dynamic representation of knowledge from interactions). In 
other words, the computational attitude is a representation of the attitude 
emergence mechanism. This mechanism computes an agent‟s attitude with 
respect to some dynamic (spontaneous) social environmental change by 
associating various “utility marks” to new knowledge learned or dynamically 
constructed during the on-going interaction processes.   
This approach is similar to other approaches concerning learning based 
on reinforcement. What distinguishes this approach from the others is a 
difference in (1) the definition of the autonomous agent as an aeis and (2) in the 
definition of the rewarding signals: while in Reinforcement Learning this 
rewarding signal is defined outside the agent, in Attitude Learning the internal 
                                                          
25  C.F. VOINEA, op. cit. 
26  Ibidem. 
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reinforcement is elaborated by the agent itself (self reinforcement) as a means of 
co-ordination its own behaviors with respect to the current goal. 
The Theory of Attitudes is fundamental for the development of a social 
simulation tool: it allows the design of artificial autonomous agents (multi-
agent) systems which can re-produce human social behavior in a computational 
medium in a believable manner. It is important also for modeling and 
simulating complex cognitive and normative aspects of the human behavior and 
society in comparison with the Bayesian Theory, for example, which can 
account for a belief system, but cannot take into account a dynamically evolving 
artificial multi-agent system with normative, behavioral morphology and 
situated cognitive aspects. 
 
 
7.  Applications of the Theory of Attitudes: Modeling Social 
Multi-Agent Systems  
 
In this paper we have been mainly interested in software autonomous 
agents who are able to develop collaborative group behaviors and learn a class 
of norm-oriented behaviors from interactions with their environment. An 
approach on group behavior might concern at least two alternatives: (i) in the 
sense of the Game Theory, i.e. based on economic gain principles, or (ii) in the 
sense of Social Sciences, i.e. based on knowledge representation and learning.  The 
choice of the type of theoretical approach has deep implications at the practical 
level in designing and experimenting with artificial Multi-Agent Systems.  
The previous and current approaches on Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are 
based on economic principles of cumulating high payoffs over time using 
instrumental reinforcement-based techniques, planning and hierarchical 
cumulative individual contributions to the accomplishment of a group goal.  
The agents are viewed as separate individual entities, relying on reward 
deliverance for action decision making. The general outcome of such a MAS 
architecture is an optimal group behavior with respect to criteria concerning: (i) 
the state space representation and search; (ii) the goal representation as reward / 
punishment, and (iii) the action decision making, usually based on planning and 
distributed action execution. The advantage of this kind of approach is the easy 
of the mathematical formalism provided by the Game Theory and Dynamic 
Programming. However, there are also some disadvantages: (i) the need for 
planning involves a time-consuming type of approach and the use of fixed pre-
defined knowledge structures whose real-time management and update 
represent drawbacks on its performances in the field; (ii) this economic-gain 
type of MAS is not always “believable” from the point of view of the team 
behavior, for team behavior is not always a matter of combinatorial 
optimization of the behavioral contributions of the member agents of a MAS to 
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the accomplishment of a shared goal. There is no group knowledge shared by 
the member agents, and the aspect of group behavior is often a matter of 
combining instrumental techniques to make the agents‟ behavior convergent on 
the accomplishment of a shared goal.  
 
 
7.1.  Norm-oriented behavior. Norms Representation  
 
The concept of norm is meant to combine two aspects: (a) the cognitive 
aspect and (b)  the operational aspect.   
From a cognitive point of view, a norm is defined as a permission or an 
obligation for an agent in an agent society to do or to not do a certain action in 
that specific agent society
27
. 
The operational aspect concerns the way this concept should operate in a 
real-time goal-oriented MAS action execution framework.   
In our approach, the notion of norms is directly connected to the notion of 
a role a social agent can play with respect to a norm
28
 
29
 
30
. On this basis, we 
define three classes of roles a social agent can play:  
 the norm source is the group or institution which is responsible with 
the norm setup. A norm source will issue the norms to all member agents of a 
group and will get feedback knowledge of their decision to comply with any of 
the issued norms.  
 the addressee is the agent itself: it is able to make a norm decision and 
to comply with one norm or another from the set of valid norms and in this case 
it will become a norm compliant.  It is also free to not comply with any norm, 
and in this case it will become a deviant.  For the social learning scenario, both 
the “source” (stimulator) agent and the “learning” (observer) agent belong to 
the addressee class. 
 the defender is the agent especially designed to register which 
member agent does not comply with the norms and to force the compliance of 
norms in the member agents. The compliance could be enforced by the use of 
sanctions.  In the case study on a soccer game simulation this role is actually 
played by the Arbiter. 
                                                          
27  CONTE, CASTELFRANCHI, Cognitive and Social Action, UCL Press, 1995. 
28  CONTE, PAOLUCCI, “Intelligent Social Learning”, in Journal of Artificial Societies 
and Social Simulation,  4, 1,  2001. 
29  CONTE, DIGNUM, “Social Monitoring and Normative Influence”, in Journal of 
Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 4, 2, 2001. 
30  CASTELFRANCHI, DIGNUM, JONKER, TREUR, “Deliberative normative agents: 
Principles and architecture”, in N.R. JENNINGS, Y. LESPERANCE, Intelligent Agents VI. Agent 
Theories, Architectures and Kanguages, Proc. 6th Internaltional Workshop, (ATAL‟99) Orlando, 
Florida, USA. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1757., 2000. 
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A norm-oriented behavior is a conceptual model for the social behavior of an 
agent in an artificial normative social system. It is a representation of the way the 
agent behaves as a consequence of its option to comply or not with the norms issued 
by its team. As the individual agent decides to comply with a certain norm in its 
owner group, its behavior will consequently be influenced by this decision. In the 
case that the agent decides not to comply with any of the norms issued by its owner 
group, then it will develop only reactive behaviors without normative influence. 
 
 
7.2.  The Model of the Social Agent 
 
The social agent is defined as an aeis endowed with: 
 an identification name,  
 an owner class,  
 a set of beliefs,  
 a set of  norms,  
 a set of roles the agent can play and their associated competences, 
 a set of abstract sensor inputs which provide support for the symbolic communication, 
 a communication language and the associated communication 
techniques and methods,  
 norm-oriented behaviors. 
 
 
7.3.  The Model of a Norm-Oriented s-MAS 
 
The Artificial Normative Social-like Multi-Agent System (s-MAS) consists of: 
 A set of individual social agents described as above;  
 A set of owners of the member agents; 
 A set of norms on the society system; 
 A communication language and symbolic communication methods and technique; 
 A set of roles the members play within the agent society (ownership relation); 
 A social situation in the agent society. 
 
 
7.4.  Building-Up Social Knowledge 
 
One of the aims of the present approach is to show how norm-oriented 
behaviors are based on knowledge from interaction in artificial multi-agent 
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systems, where by “knowledge” we mean both knowledge about what a norm 
is and knowledge about what a relation between norm, group membership 
and group goal represents in a social normative system. The present approach 
has focused on those social phenomena which may be reproduced or may 
emerge in artificial social systems as social learning processes. One such 
social phenomenon is the social facilitation as a form of intrinsic social 
learning
31
  in which some agent(s) may be led by other agent(s) to acquire 
new means for achieving their own goals.  In social facilitation models, there 
is always a source agent, which plays the role of facilitator in stimulating the 
learning process, and an observer (learning) agent, which actually learns. 
Learning occurs either as a (i) knowledge acquisition process, (ii) as a 
behavioral learning process, or (iii) as behavior propagation process. For the 
observer agent, learning consists in acquiring new means to achieve a goal by 
providing new relevance to already known data: objects, events or other 
agents.   
The case study focuses on a typical case of social facilitation: local or 
stimulus enhancement. This could provide for two types of attitude 
emergence: either comply with some norm and learn something about goal 
achieving or learn the norm itself and extend the interaction state space. The 
first type is learning by means of knowledge_from_interaction
32
 and it could 
either result in a change at the behavior expression level (if the source agent 
has performed a certain behavior, the observer agent performs the same 
behavior with respect to its current contextual situation, objects and agents) or 
it can result in a change at the behavior motivational level (the source agent 
draws the attention of the observer agent on a certain object/event/agent which 
favors the latter in achieving its own goals). 
The approach builds upon existing Dual Dynamics (DD) behavior 
design framework developed by the Behavior Engineering Team of the 
Fraunhofer AiS Institute for the Robocop agents
33
. The DD-Architecture is 
a behavior architecture design approach on robot agents
34
 
35
 
36
. The 
DD-Architecture is based on processes and quantities: any agent-environment 
interaction is represented by means of reactive sensorial and control 
                                                          
31  A. BANDURA, Social learning theory, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1977. 
32  C.F. VOINEA, Agenţi artificiali autonomi: arhitectură, algoritmi, aplicaţii, Editura 
Ecologică, Bucureşti, 1998. 
33  This paper reports experimental researches developed while the author was with the 
Fraunhofer AiS Institute at Schloss Birlinghoven, Sankt Augustin, Germany, in 2001. 
34  H. JAEGER, The Dual Dynamics Design Scheme for Behavior-based Robots: 
A Tutorial, Technical Report, GMD, Sankt Augustin, Germany, 1995. 
35  A. BREDENFELD, H.U. KOBIALKA, “Team Cooperation using Dual Dynamics”, in 
Proc. of Workshop on “Balancing Reactivity and Social Deliberation in MAS”, ECAI‟2000, 
August 22, Berlin, Germany, 2000. 
36  A. BREDENFELD, “DD-Designer”, AiS.GMD. Review Document, 2000. 
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processes resulting in updates of certain resources or quantities represented 
as local or global variables. DD‟s knowledge representation framework is 
based on several types of processing structures, namely sensor inputs 
(sensor filters) and two levels of behavioral competence: reactive 
(elementary) and control (high-level). The math formalism is a set of 
differential equations which models the reactiveness of the agent to  
environmental clues and the control over such reactive competences. There 
is no explicit goal representation. Instead, a target dynamics equation 
states what a behavior process should achieve or do, and an activation 
dynamics equation states when and how certain actions or states should be 
achieved. The DD formalism is generalized for complex behaviors by 
means of modes, a concept borrowed from the cognitive science for 
describing low-level perception-based representations of beliefs
37
. The 
mode concept provides the support for an account on how complex 
behaviors could be achieved. All behaviors which are active or not active 
at a given moment of time are represented as a mode. A belief in the DD 
conceptual model is a representation of all interaction knowledge the 
agent has got already from its interactions with the other agents and with 
the environment. The social goal (team goal in the case study) is a 
normative goal and has an implicit representation in the sense that each 
high-level norm-oriented behavior is focused on accomplishing the 
activation constraints imposed from the norm description. 
 
Owner 
class 
(Team_Code) 
 
 
self-identity 
(Agent Name_Code) 
 
norms 
 
mode 
(behaviours’ activations) 
 
activations array 
 
 
set of norms valid in the owner team 
 
 
each agent is a personalized agent, that is, it knows its own 
name code and also its owner team‟s name code 
 
the Owner Class is the current team the agent is assigned to by the designer 
 
 
Figure 3. Beliefs dynamic representation in the DD-Designer 
 
                                                          
37  Ibidem. 
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7.5.  s-MAS Modeling  
 
Taking all these into consideration, our first concern was to what kind of 
social-like aeis could be designed using the DD framework. Modeling has 
focused on the following issues: 
(i) representation structure and concepts of the relevant social 
knowledge like:  
(a) norms as operational behavioral constraints;  
(b) beliefs as enhanced mode representation;  
(c) social sanctions;  
(d) social goals and roles;  
(e) the ownership relations between agents and teams: each agent 
must belong to a certain team in the sense of the set theory. 
(ii) modeling the norm-oriented behaviors: norm-oriented behavior is a 
social behavior; it is based on inputs from abstract sensors and on 
social knowledge concerning norm content, role adoption, 
competence evaluation and social interaction with other agents 
(communication); 
(iii) modeling the high-level “cognitive engines” of the system: (a) the 
communication language and protocols; (b) the social context; (c) 
the psychological context. 
In this regard, in the DD representational framework, the cognitive model of a 
norm is that of an admissible procedural option (enhancement or limitation) which 
follows from the condition that each agent belongs to a certain team: it is concerned 
with what the member agent is allowed to do (enhancement) and what it is not 
allowed to do (limitation or restriction). The team is viewed as an owner class 
endowed with certain rights over its members. The ownership relation induces in the 
agent awareness with regard to the norms valid in that team: the agent becomes aware 
of these norms because they are communicated to all member agents of a team by a 
norm source. From a DD-Designer point of view, a norm has been defined as a Team 
Variable. A set of dedicated Methods are used to communicate norms to all team 
member agents using a black-board communication technique. This communication 
mechanism makes also possible that each agent lets the team  know if and what norm 
it is currently complying with. This helped at providing the Robocop agents with a 
generalized well-defined set of dynamical representations and cognitive concepts.  
 
 
7.6.  The normative social behavior architecture 
 
Upon the DD-architecture background, the present approach built-up 
several more levels of representation and behavior, named DD+ (see Figure 3):  
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 the representations of social knowledge:  norms, competences, roles, 
beliefs, social goals;  
 the means to construct and update social knowledge: (a) social 
learning methods and algorithms, (b) communication language; 
 the norm-oriented behaviors: the agents comply with one norm or 
another and this compliance influences all its other behaviors; 
 the communication language: the agents communicate their name 
codes, ownership (team) code, current position, competences, roles;  
 the emergence of social behavior (attitude): cooperation has been 
considered such an emergent phenomena; it may come up from the dynamics of 
the three engines of the aeis: reactive, communication and social.  
 
 
Figure 4.  The social normative behavior architecture 
 
 
8.  The Case Study: Social Learning in a Soccer Game Scenario 
 
The case study was meant to answer the question: how cooperation could 
be obtained by using attitude emergence in two multi-agent systems involved in 
a soccer game? 
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Figure 5.  Case Study: Soccer Game 
 
 
8.1.  Simulation Scenarios 
 
The implementation of the s-MAS is based on typical situations in a 
soccer game from which there have been selected relevant social facilitation 
scenarios as follows: 
1. local or stimulus enhancement: the situation in which one agent has the 
ball and, due to its role in the field (either as a midfielder or as a forward 
player), he chooses to pass the ball to its closest neighbour agent which is 
in the most favorable position for scoring (weak cooperation scenario); 
2. cooperation between the member players of the same team with 
respect to the goal: the agent dynamically assumes a role depending 
on its position in the field and passes the ball to the closest of  its 
team‟s members, favoring the latter player in scoring (strong 
cooperation scenario). 
In such a scenario, learning results in:  
 acquiring knowledge (or plan) about the relation between agent‟s 
ultimate goal and the active norm set,  
 acquiring knowledge about the relation between agent‟s ultimate goal 
and its current contextual positioning in the field by evaluating the distances to 
the closest neighbor agents and the best kicking angles / positions; 
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 updating the modes, which represent the agents‟ beliefs with respect to 
the norm-oriented behaviors which they have to perform in order to achieve 
their goals. 
 
 
8.2. AEIS Instantiation as s-MAS 
 
To this aim, we have used the following instantiation of the s-MAS 
model using a set of Team Variables which are meant to provide the support for 
the symbolic communication between the member agents of a team, between 
the member agents and the Arbiter, and between the Norm-Source and the 
Arbiter. Each Member Agent is endowed with a set of Team Variables  
which helps the communication process. The set of Team Variables are: the 
norm-source identification (Team_Code), the norms identification 
(Norm_Code), agent identification (Agent_Code), the social reinforcers: 
Social_Recognition, Social_Sanction. 
 
 
8.3. AEIS Implementation 
 
The Norm-Oriented Behaviors set is meant to represent the high-level 
behaviors which are developed by the Individual Agents as a consequence of 
the norm-compliance decision process, whose output is the norm the agent 
comply with at the current moment of time (NormCompliance_i).   
Norm compliance in the field results in certain roles the agents 
dynamically adopt during the soccer game: no matter if the soccer formation 
type is “attack” or “defense”, the players can exchange roles in the field during 
the game. There have been defined several interaction processes for the 
following situations:  
(i) NormCompliance: the norms are predefined, issued by a norm 
source which is the team itself;  
(ii) RoleAdoption: if the agent moves over certain areas in the field, then 
a role change takes place. Depending on the formation type (attack 
or defense) and on the position in the field (forward, middle, back, 
center, wing), the agent will adopt a new role with different 
competences. If the agent fails in executing its new competences 
following from the current role adoption, then a social sanction is 
delivered from the team or from the Arbiter.  
RoleAdoption Process: 
quantities: competence = ’PassTheBall’, role = ’Midfielder’; 
while ActiveAgent repeat : 
if role  new-role then competence  new-competence 
 92 
 
 
Figure 6. (a) – NormCompliance is a norm-oriented high-level behavior in the DD-Designer 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  (b) – Norms are defined as Team Variables in the DD-Designer38 (DD-simulations 
performed with the courtesy of the Behavior Engineering Team, Fraunhofer AiS Institute, Germany) 
                                                          
38  C.F. VOINEA, Research Report, Fraunhofer AiS Institute, Sankt-Augustin, Germany, 
October 2001. 
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(iii) Dynamic Competence Setup: it is assumed that the agents 
communicate to each other their identification codes so that they 
know where they are in the field all the time; this algorithm receives 
as input the current position of the agent in the field and 
consequently assigns a specific competence to the player, like: “right 
wing midfielder”, “central midfield”, “left wing midfielder”, 
“forward”, etc.  
Competence_Setup Process:  
quantities: position_in_the_field M = [mij]; competence C = [cij], 
i = 1,…,X, j = 1,…,Y; 
while agent_is_in_the_field repeat: 
current_position(current_X,current_Y); 
m(current _X, current_Y)  cij 
As a consequence, the active agent has to perform a set of high-level 
behaviors like:  
MoveToBall; 
TurnToBall; 
CommunicateBallPositionToNeighbor;,  
FindClosestAgent; 
PredictAngle; 
KickForwardOnAngle 
The activation of these high-level behaviors are representing the mode: 
 
ModeActivationArray=[aNormCompliance_1, ..., aNormCompliance_K] (4) 
 
where: aNormCompliance_i concern the activation of the norm-oriented 
behavior called “NormCompliance_i”. The activation array (mode) is learned 
and used in the subsequent observable behaviors of any agent as the background 
for future behavior expressions. 
 
 
8.4. Simulations Analysis 
 
The learning problem was formulated as follows: given a set of control 
behaviors, ic , and a coordination policy, k, the agent learns an attitude 
function, A, by means of a set of coupled control and coordination processes, 
such that the agent is successfully transferred from the current state to the goal 
state. The agent learns structural coupling relations in which minimal 
coordination values, att, are associated to maximum internal rewards values, r. 
The learning_while_interacting method uses the cob matrix to update the 
coupled learning processes. 
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Figure 8.  The computational attitude 
 
The computational architecture (see Figure 8) which consists of 
several neural networks (the A_learning, R_learning and the model_M 
neural network, respectively) and a re-constructive memory (RcM) 
represented by means of the cob matrix. Learned variations in control and 
in the coordination values are used to update the action parameters and to 
modify the current decision of the player agent. Each learned variation in 
action is used as knowledge from interaction which updates the re-
constructive memory. Behavioral patterns are therefore re-constructed 
based on the content of the RcM during each behavioral cycle
39
. 
The neural networks require that the agent is trained with a model of 
attitude, and then left to update this attitude model through learning. The 
cob matrix provides a simple way to represent structural coupling relations 
between behavior control and coordination processes. The behavioral 
coupling variables (cobs) accumulate knowledge about the active 
behaviors which simultaneously update the same state variable. Provided 
with both re-constructive and associational mechanisms, each agent starts 
learning dependencies between behaviors and specific control values. This 
results in a set of coupling relations which are transmitted from one 
behavioral cycle to another (within the RcM module of each agent) and 
                                                          
39  EADEM, “Attitude Learning in Autonomous Agents”, in 2nd Workshop on Agent-
Based Simulation, Passau, 2001. 
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from one agent to the other (within the multi-agent system). The 
behavioral coordination between agents becomes evident when behavioral 
patterns are re-constructed on the basis of this set of structurally coupled 
learning processes. 
The case study included the weak cooperation and the strong 
cooperation scenarios. In both of them, the learning task for the agent was 
to learn to pass the ball on a minimal-length distance to either the closest 
neighbour team-member agent or to the best positioned in the field team-member 
agent. Both weak and strong scenarios involved a typical situation of 
social facilitation. In each scenario, the agent has been previously trained 
how to pass the ball in order to facilitate either the goal scoring or the 
advance of another team-member agent to a better position in the field. 
The simulations resulted in two attitude emergence situations: in the 
weak scenario, the agent learned to co-operate with the closest neighbor 
team-member agent (see Figure 7a), while in the strong scenario the agent 
learned to use itself a facilitating position from other team-member agents 
in order to try scoring a goal (see Figure 7b). 
In the former situation the attitude which has emerged was 
minimizing a distance_to_the_neighbor criterion, while the attitude which 
has emerged in the later situation was maximizing a piece of knowledge 
from interaction, namely a number of cumulative contributions from other 
team member agents to better positioning the ball with respect to the 
opposite-team„s goalkeeper. 
This set of simulations provided evidence with concern to the 
following issues: 
 dynamic representations of knowledge about norm-oriented 
behaviors, dynamic representations of knowledge about dynamic 
competence setup and role adoption; 
 individual and social determinations of social knowledge 
building-up process; 
 social learning by means of social facilitation, in particular local 
stimulus enhancement: the agents are able to learn schema of social 
planning for goal achieving; 
 emergence of social cooperation phenomenon in the framework of 
norm compliance in a social-like normative multi-agent system. 
The simulations showed how the soccer players agents learned to 
pass the ball from one to another as a consequence of their complying with 
specific norms. The simulations have been successfully performed and 
showed that the agents are able to improve their game by means of social 
facilitation schema like the “ball passing” . 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 7. Social learning in a social facilitation scenario: passing the ball from one member 
of a team to another member of the same team in the presence of members of the opposite team 
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9.  Conclusions: Interpretation of the Computational Attitude 
 
There are different ways in which computational attitude may be 
interpreted. This is due to the fact that attitude emergence addresses some 
fundamental issues: knowledge, interaction, representation, memory and 
remembering, learning and situated cognition. The basic assumptions and 
working hypotheses adopted here require an explanation of the philosophical 
and computational background in the elaboration of the Theory of Attitudes. 
The way computational attitude is viewed in this approach is basically as 
a dynamically built-up representation inside the agent‟s memory during the 
interaction with the environment. From a cognitive point of view, the attitude is 
internally constructed by the aeis agent during learning: it provides for a 
dynamic representation of the agent-environment interaction at each interaction 
cycle. However, there is a fundamental difference between the representation 
means in the classical ML, KR and AI sciences and the representation means 
introduced in this approach. This difference reside mainly in the use of memory. 
The traditional view of memory is that of storage device: knowledge is 
produced and stored in the agent memory for future use and retrieval. To us 
here, the point memory makes in an aeis agent is the capacity to rather re-
construct than re-produce knowledge which arises from the usual interactions.  
Where does this view come from? – Basically, this view is shaped by the deep 
belief that our representations are not stored entities, but rather entities which 
are produced as we interact with our world, that is, produced each time we 
interact with the world. This view is enhanced by our type of experience, which 
builds-up upon our always being in a situation, and upon our having a body.  
This particular kind of experience would suggest that we are always in a context 
or a situation which we carry over from the immediate past and update in terms 
of events that in the light of this past situation are seen to be significant
40
. What 
we actually carry over from the immediate past to the immediate future is not 
quite a „suitcase“ full of pieces of knowledge which we can inspect and search 
for that particular one which we need now, but rather a configuration of our 
body which lets us know about us and the world all the time, spontaneously and 
comprehensively. It is this particular kind of body configuration that makes us 
able to rather re-construct our primary perceptual experience each time anew 
than retrieve it along fix traces inside our memory
41, 42
. This is not to say that 
animals or children do not start with certain fixed responses
43
, and animals do 
                                                          
40  M. HEIDEGGER, op. cit. 
41  F.C. BARTLETT, op. cit. 
42  W.J. FREEMAN, Societies of Brains, LEA, 1995. 
43  J. PIAGET, Biologie et Connaissance: Essais sur les relations entre les régulations 
organiques et les processus cognitifs, Gallimard, Paris, 1967. 
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not often preserve them over a lifetime
44
. It is actually why learning exists at all. 
The point I want to make in assuming this view is that these responses are 
subject to permanent variation (even if only a small one!) during the interaction 
with the environment over their whole lifetime. This is basically why no fix 
responses or facts with built-in significance remain in an adult human being 
which are not under the control of a situation. From this point of view, the 
attitude as defined by the Theory of Attitudes resembles the one described by 
Bartlett in his account on memory use in human remembering. 
The point I wish to make is that, assuming a view of „being-in-the-
world“ upon cognition, a way ought to be found in order to prove that there are 
interaction processes with the environment upon which agents (living agents as 
well as artificial agents) build-up their cognitive capacity, and that these 
interaction processes make them cope with the environmental change and often 
survive this change. I have pursued this idea in the attempt to show that there 
are behavioral patterns and structure underlying the interaction processes 
specific to autonomous agents organized as aeiss.  
Future work will develop applications of the above model of s-MAS and 
representations of norms and social scenarios in order to simulate political 
leadership and voting behavior. 
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